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MODIFICATION OF AN OUT OF STATE CHILD CUSTODY
DECREE UNDER THE UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY
JURISDICTION ACT AND THE PARENTAL KIDNAPPING
PREVENTION ACT
Arlin F. Ruby*
Jurisdiction of child custody matters in Virginia is affected by
both the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act 1 (UCCJA) as
adopted in Virginia and the federally enacted Parental Kidnapping
Prevention Act of 19802 (PKPA). This article analyzes the jurisdictional requirements under both Acts, discusses the interrelation* Judge, Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court, City of Richmond, 2000 Mecklenburg Street, Richmond, Virginia 23223. LL.B., DePaul University, 1950. The author
welcomes comments from the bench and the bar with reference to any views herein
addressed.
The author gratefully acknowledges the valuable assistance of Torrence M. Hinnant for
her many worthwhile suggestions in the editing and rewriting of this paper.
1. UNWaORM CHILD CUSTODY JURSDICTION ACT, 9 U.L.A. 111 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
UCCJA]. Adopted by the 1979 General Assembly, the Virginia enactment is modeled substantially after the Uniform Law with two major exceptions: (i) the Purposes and Construction section of the Uniform Act and (ii) the section giving calendar priority to jurisdictional/
custody questions were not adopted. VA. CODE Am. §§ 26-125 to -146 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
See 9 U.L.A. 111 (Master ed. 1979) for comprehensive notes as to how the principles of the
UCCJA should be applied and for section-by-section and state-by-state court annotations.
See also Comment, The Uniform Child Custody JurisdictionAct in Virginia, 14 U. RICH.
L. REv. 435 (1979).
2. Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-611, §§ 7-8, 94 Stat. 3568,
3568-71 (§ 8 codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (Supp. IV 1980)) [hereinafter cited as PKPA].
Section 7(c) states its purposes:
The general purposes of sections 6 to 10 of this Act are to(1) promote cooperation between State courts to the end that a determination of
custody and visitation is rendered in the State which can best decide the case in the
interest of the child;
(2) promote and expand the exchange of information and other forms of mutual
assistance between States which are concerned with the same child;
(3) facilitate the enforcement of custody and visitation decrees of sister States;
(4) discourage continuing interstate controversies over child custody in the interest
of greater stability of home environment and of secure family relationships for the
child;
(5) avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict between State courts in matters of
child custody and visitation which have in the past resulted in the shifting of children
from State to State with harmful effects on their well-being; and
(6) deter interstate abductions and other unilateral removals of children undertaken to obtain custody and visitation awards.
PKPA § 7(c).
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ship between the two and suggests a five step analysis by which a
Virginia court may determine its jurisdiction in light of this
authority.
I.

A.

PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

Enactment of the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of

1980
It was widely recognized, even under the UCCJA, that prior to
the enactment of the PKPA, the full faith and credit clause of the
United States Constitution3 had no required application to child
custody decrees because of their inherently transitory nature.
Thus, child custody decrees were always subject to modification for
just cause by courts of competent jurisdiction.4 The practical consequences of this rule led to a growing number of custody cases in
the various state courts, with each court applying its own laws,
practices, and procedures in determining jurisdiction to hear such
cases and the effect to be given to custody decrees of other states.
These legal realities contributed to a tendency by the parties involved in a custody dispute to resort to (1) the seizure, concealment, and interstate transportation of children who were the subjects of the custody disputes; (2) disregard of court orders; (3)
excessive relitigation; and (4) obtaining conflicting custody decrees
in different states.5
3. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 provides that "[flull faith and credit shall be given in each
state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state. And the Congress may by general laws prescribe the manner in which such acts, records and proceedings
shall be proved, and the effect thereof."
4. See PKPA § 7(a)(4) and note 5 infra. See also Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187 (1962); Oehl
v. Oehl, 221 Va. 618, 272 S.E.2d 441 (1980); Osborne v. Osborne, 215 Va. 205, 207 S.E.2d 875
(1974).
5. PKPA § 7(a) provides:
The Congress finds that(1) there is a large and growing number of cases annually involving disputes between persons claiming rights of custody and visitation of children under the laws,
and in the courts, of different States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, and the territories and possessions of the United States;
(2) the laws and practices by which the courts of those jurisdictions determine their
jurisdiction to decide such disputes, and the effect to be given the decisions of such
disputes by the courts of other jurisdictions, are often inconsistent and conflicting,
(3) those characteristics of the law and practice in such cases, along with the limits
imposed by a Federal system on the authority of each such jurisdiction to conduct
investigations and take other actions outside its own boundaries, contribute to a tendency of parties involved in such disputes to frequently resort to the seizure, restraint, concealment, and interstate transportation of children, the disregard of court
orders, excessive relitigation of cases, obtaining of conflicting orders by the courts of
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Because of these conditions, Congress, in enacting the PKPA
found it necessary to "establish national standards under which
courts" of the various states "will determine that jurisdiction to
decide" custody "disputes and the effect to be given by each such
jurisdiction to such decisions by the courts of other such jurisdictions."' The tour de force of the PKPA is the provision which requires that full faith and credit be given to child custody determinations when made by a court of another state consistent with the
provisions of the PKPA7 The statute, by giving child custody decrees full faith and credit between the courts of the various states,
"makes the most sweeping change in the past 200 years in the implementation of the full faith and credit clause." s The PKPA requires that "[tihe appropriate authorities of every State shall enforce according to its terms, and shall not modify except as
provided.., any child custody determination made consistently
with the provisions of [the PKPA] by a court of another State."9
The PKPA further refines and buttresses the full faith and
credit status of child custody decrees by three additional provisions. The Act (1) specifies what is meant by a child custody determination "made consistently with the provisions" of the PKPA;10
various jurisdictions, and interstate travel and communication that is so expensive
and time consuming as to disrupt their occupations and commercial activities; and
(4) among the results of those conditions and activities are the failure of the courts
of such jurisdictions to give full faith and credit to the judicial proceedings of the
other jurisdictions, the deprivation of rights of liberty and property without due process of law, burdens on commerce among such jurisdictions and with foreign nations,
and harm to the welfare of children and their parents and other custodians.
6. PKPA § 7(b) provides:
For those reasons it is necessary to establish a national system for locating parents
and children who travel from one such jurisdiction to another and are concealed in
connection with such disputes, and to establish national standards under which the
courts of such jurisdictions will determine their jurisdiction to decide such disputes
and the effect to be given by each such jurisdiction to such decisions by the courts of
other such jurisdictions.
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (Supp. IV 1980). See, e.g., Leslie L.F. v. Constance F., 110 Misc. 2d
381, 441 N.Y.S.2d 911 (1981).
8. Foster and Freed, Law and the Family: Child-Custody Decrees-Jurisdiction,N.Y.L.J.,
Apr. 24, 1981, at 1, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Foster and Freed]; quoted in Virginia E.E. v.
Albert S.P., 110 Misc. 2d 448, .. , 440 N.Y.S.2d 979, 983 (1981).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c) (Supp. IV 1980) provides:
A child custody determination made by a court of a State is consistent with the
provisions of this section only if(1) such court has jurisdiction under the law of such State; and
(2) one of the following conditions is met.
(A) such State (i) is the home State of the child on the date of the corn-
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(2) confers continuing jurisdiction in the state which made the
prior custody decree as long as that state remains the residence of
the child or of any contestant;" and (3) provides for modification
by one state of a custody decree made by another state if (i) the
modifying state has jurisdiction to make child custody determination and (ii) the court of the prior decree state either no longer has
jurisdiction, or still having jurisdiction, has declined to exercise
12
such jurisdiction to modity its prior custody decree.

Therefore, it is now clear that under the PKPA:
mencement of the proceeding, or (ii) had been the child's home State within
six months before the date of the commencement of the proceeding and the
child" is absent from such State because of his removal or retention by a contestant or for other reasons, and a contestant continues to live in such State;
(B)(i) it appears that no other State would have jurisdiction under subparagraph (A), and (ii) it is in the best interest of the child that a court of such
State assume jurisdiction because (I) the child and his parents, or the child
and at least one contestant, have a significant connection with such State other
than mere physical presence in such State, and (II) there is available in such
State substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future care, protection, training, and personal relationships;
(C) the child is physically present in such State and (i) the child has been
abandoned, or (ii) it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because
he has been subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse;
(D)(i) it appears that no other State would have jurisdiction under subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (E), or another State has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that the State whose jurisdiction is in issue is the more
appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child, and (ii) it is in the
best interest of the child that such court assume jurisdiction; or
(E) the court has continuing jurisdiction pursuant to subsection (d) of this
section.
28 U.S.C. § 1738A(b)(4) (Supp. IV 1980) defines "home state" as:
the State in which, immediately preceding the time involved, the child lived with his
parents, a parent, or a person acting as parent, for at least six consecutive months,
and in the case of a child less than six months old, the State in which the child lived
from birth with any of such persons. Periods of temporary absence of any of such
persons are counted as part of the six-month or other period.
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(d) (Supp. IV 1980) (emphasis added) provides:
The jurisdiction of a court of a State which has made a child custody determination
consistently with the provisions of this section continues as long as the requirement
of subsection (c)(1) of this section continues to be met and such State remains the
residence of the child or of any contestant.
28 U.S.C. § 1738A(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1980) defines contestant as a "person, including a parent,
who claims a right to custody or visitation of a child."
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(f) (Supp. IV 1980) provides:
A court of a State may modify a determination of the custody of the same child
made by a court of another State, if(1) it has jurisdiction to make such a child custody determination; and
(2) the court of the other State no longer has jursidiction, or it has declined to
exercise such jurisdiction to modify such determination.
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[o]bligatory full faith and credit extends to every state which shall
enforce and shall not modify any child custody determination made
consistently with the provisions of the PKPA. . . The only exception to this mandatory obligation is the section of the statute permitting a state to modify a custody award of a sister state ....
"[A] custody order or decree that does not conform to federal standards may be rejected out of hand. Orders and decrees that are in
conformity must be honored, even though subject to modification in
the first forum. The nonfinal character of custody decrees no longer
may serve as an excuse for their non-recognition."1' 3
B.

The Relationship Between the UCCJA and the PKPA

Even a superficial comparison between the grounds for jurisdiction in the UCCJA1" and the grounds for jurisdiction in the
PKPA1 5 reflects that there are substantial legal differences in the

state and federal statutes. First, the UCCJA provides four grounds
for jurisdiction" while the PKPA contains five grounds for jurisdiction,"' the fifth ground providing for "continuing jurisdiction."

Additionally, each of the four grounds for jurisdiction set forth
in the Virginia statute is separated from the other by the word

"or," thus establishing alternative bases for jurisdiction. In contrast, the PKPA contains important qualifying language between
the first ground for jurisdiction ("home state") and the second

ground for jurisdiction ("significant connection"), so that a court,
under the PKPA, cannot base jurisdiction on a significant connection unless "it appears that no other state would have [home state]
jurisdiction. . . ,"' thus establishing exclusive and continuing ju-

risdiction in the home state. Therefore, the PKPA relegates "significant connection" jurisdiction "to a contingency status for custody jurisdiction or . .. a 'vacuum situation which makes it
superfluous.' "I"
Another

important preliminary consideration

that must be

pointed out is that the PKPA articulates a federal policy of pre13. Virginia E.E. v. Albert S.P., 110 Misc. 2d at
Foster and Freed, supra note 8,at 1, col. 1).

,

440 N.Y.S.2d at 983 (quoting

14. See VA. CODE ANN.§ 20-126(A) (Cum. Supp. 1982). See infra note 32.
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(A)-(E) (Supp. IV 1980). See supra note 10.

16. See infra note 29.
17. See supra note 10.
18. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(B)(i) (Supp. IV 1980). See supra note 10.
19. Virginia E.E. v. Albert S.P., 110 Misc. 2d at -, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 983-84; Bahr v.
Bahr, 110 Misc. 2d 665, -, 442 N.Y.S.2d 687, 689 (1981). See infra note 30.
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emption, and under the supremacy clause of the United States
Constitution, the PKPA must be accorded priority.2 0 A careful
reading of the federal statute reveals clearly that the assertion of
the federal priority of the PKPA does not constitute an interference with the power of a state to determine the substantive law to
be applied in resolving an award of custody and/or visitation. This
is because priority under the supremacy clause, given to the PKPA
over Virginia statutes dealing with jurisdiction of child custody
disputes, is invoked only in the context of determining whether or
not a prior out of state custody decree should be accorded full
faith and credit.
C. In the Process to Determine Jurisdictionto Modify an Out of
State Custody Decree, What Consideration if Any Should be
Given to Simultaneous Proceedings in Another State, Inconvenient Forum, or Unclean Hands?
Virginia has enacted those sections of the UCCJA which deal
with a court's declining to exercise jurisdiction due to simultaneous
proceedings in other states,2 ' the finding of inconvenient forum, 2
20. See Foster and Freed, supra note 8, at 1, col. 1; Virginia E.E. v. Albert S.P., 110 Misc.
441
-, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 983; Leslie L.F. v. Constance F., 110 Misc. 2d at -,
2d at
N.Y.S.2d at 913-14.
U.S. CONST. art. VI provides in part:

This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state
shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or laws of any state to the
contrary notwithstanding.
Preemption occurs under the supremacy clause of Article VI when Congress enacts federal
legislation which either (i) supersedes state authority, or (ii) is in conflict with state law, or
(iii) when state regulation would interfere unduly with the accomplishment of congressional
objectives. G. GuNTHER, CONsTrrUIONAL

21.

LAW

343-44 (10th ed. 1980).

§ 20-129 (Cum. Supp. 1982) states:
A. A court of this State shall not exercise its jurisdiction under this chapter if at
the time of filing the petition a proceeding concerning the custody of the child was
pending in a court of another state exercising jurisdiction substantially in conformity
with this chapter, unless the proceeding is stayed by the court of the other state
because this State is a more appropriate forum or for other reasons.
B. Before hearing the petition in a custody proceeding the court shall examine the
pleadings and other information supplied by the parties under § 20-132 and shall
consult the child custody registry established under § 20-139 concerning the pendency of proceedings with respect to the child in other states. If the court has reason
to believe that proceedings may be pending in another state it shall direct an inquiry
to the clerk of the court or other appropriate official of the other state.
C. If the court is informed during the course of the proceeding that a proceeding
concerning the custody of the child was pending in another state before the court
assumed jurisdiction it shall stay the proceeding and communicate with the court in

VA. CODE ANN.
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which the other proceeding is pending to the end that the issue may be litigated in
the more appropriate forum and that information be exchanged in accordance with
§§ 20-142 through 20-145. If a court of this State has made a custody decree before
being informed of a pending proceeding in a court of another state it shall immediately inform that court of the fact. If the court is informed that a proceeding was
commenced in another state after it assumed jurisdiction it shall likewise inform the
other court to the end that the issues may be litigated in the more appropriate forum.
In a comparable but not identical provision, the PKPA, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(g) (Supp. IV
1980), provides:
A court of a State shall not exercise jurisdiction in any proceeding for a custody
determination commenced during the pendency of a proceeding in a court of another
State where such court of that other State is exercising jurisdiction consistently with
the provisions of this section to make a custody determination.
However, the application of this subsection (g) is conditioned upon the out of state court's
exercising jurisdiction "consistently" with the PKPA. In order to adjudicate such consistency the Virginia court must still determine first, whether it has jurisdiction to inquire into
such consistency (see Step I of Part II infra); second, whether the out of state court's exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with the PKPA (see Step 3 of Part II infra); and third, if
the out of state court is proceeding in a modification hearing of its prior custody decree,
then the Virginia court must inquire into and determine if such other state is still the residence of either any contestant or the child (see Step 5 of Part H infra).
22. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-130 (Cum. Supp. 1982) provides:
A. A court which has jurisdiction under this chapter to make an initial or modification decree may decline to exercise its jurisdiction any time before making a decree if
it finds that it is an inconvenient forum to make a custody determination under the
circumstances of the case and that a court of another state is a more appropriate
forum.
B. A finding of inconvenient forum may be made upon the court's own motion or
upon motion of a party or a guardian ad litem or other representative of the child.
C. In determining if it is an inconvenient forum, the court shall consider if it is in
the interest of the child that another state assume jurisdiction. For this purpose it
may take into account the following factors, among others:
1. If another state is or recently was the child's home state;
2. If another state has a closer connection with the child and his family or with the
child and one or more of the contestants;
3. If substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future care, protection,
training, and personal relationships is more readily available in another state; and
4. If the parties have agreed on another forum which is no less appropriate.
D. Before determining whether to decline or retain jurisdiction the court may communicate with a court of another state and exchange information pertinent to the
assumption of jurisdiction by either court with a view to assuring that jurisdiction
will be exercised by the more appropriate court and that a forum will be available to
the parties.
E. If the court finds that it is an inconvenient forum and that a court of another
state is a more appropriate forum, it may dismiss the proceedings, or it may stay the
proceedings upon condition that a custody proceeding be promptly commenced in
another named state or upon any other conditions which may be just and proper,
including the condition that a moving party stipulate his consent and submission to
the jurisdiction of the other forum.
F. The court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction under this chapter if a custody
determination is incidental to an action for divorce or another proceeding while retaining jurisdiction over the divorce or other proceeding.
G. If it appears to the court that it is clearly an inappropriate forum it may require
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or misconduct or "unclean hands."2 3 The query now posed is
whether consideration of these circumstances must be taken into
account and applied in the step-by-step legal analysis to determine
whether a Virginia court has jurisdiction to modify a prior out of
state custody decree. It is submitted that the correct answer to this
question is a short and simple NO! Consideration of simultaneous
proceedings in other states, misconduct, unclean hands and forum
non conveniens is premature in determining whether jurisdiction
lies in a Virginia court to modify a prior out of state custody
decree.
This conclusion relies on a review of the various Commissioners'
Notes to the UCCJA,24 dealing with sections 6, 7, and 8 of the Uniform Act. 25 The Commissioners' Note to section 6 states that sections 6 and 7 of the UCCJA, dealing respectively with simultaneous proceedings in other jurisdictions and inconvenient forum,
"must be read together," and "[iun a proper case jurisdiction is
the party who commenced the proceedings to pay, in addition to the costs of the
proceedings in this State, necessary travel and other expenses, including attorneys'
fees, incurred by other parties or their witnesses.
H. Upon dismissal or stay of the proceedings under this section the court shall
inform that court found to be the more appropriate forum of this fact, or if the court
which would have jurisdiction in the other state is not certainly known, shall transmit
the information to the court administrator or other appropriate official for forwarding
to the appropriate court.
I. Any communication received from another state informing this State of a finding of inconvenient forum because a court of this State is the more appropriate forum
shall be filed in the appropriate court. Upon assuming jurisdiction the court of this
State shall inform the original court of this fact.
23. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-131 (Cum. Supp. 1982) provides:
A. If the petitioner for an initial decree has wrongfully taken the child from another state or has engaged in similar reprehensible conduct the court may decline to
exercise jurisdiction if this is just and proper under the circumstances.
B. Unless required in the interest of the child, the court shall not exercise its jurisdiction to modify a custody decree of another state if the petitioner, without consent
of the person entitled to custody, has improperly removed the child from the physical
custody of the person entitled to custody or has improperly retained the child after a
visit or other temporary relinquishment of physical custody. If the petitioner has violated any other provision of a custody decree of another state the court may decline
to exercise its jurisdiction if this is just and proper under the circumstances.
C. In appropriate cases a court dismissing a petition under this section may charge
the petitioner with necessary travel and other expenses, including attorneys' fees, incurred by other parties or their witnesses.
24. 9 U.L.A. 134-35, 139, 142-43 (Master ed. 1979).
25. Section 6 of the UCCJA corresponds to VA. CODE ANN. § 20-129 (Cum. Supp. 1982);
section 7 corresponds to VA. CODE ANN. § 20-130 (Cum. Supp. 1982); and section 8 corresponds to VA. CODE ANN. § 20-131 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
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yielded to the other state.

' 26

It is submitted that the word

"yielded" contemplates giving up something already acquired
which, in this context, clearly means giving up jurisdiction that the
court has. Therefore, consideration of simultaneous proceedings in
other states is not involved in the initial analytical process of determining whether a state has jurisdiction, but is considered only
after that court, having determined that it has jurisdiction, will
yield the same to another state.
The Commissioners' Note to section 7 of the UCCJA states:
"[T]his provision . . . serves as a second check on jurisdiction

once the test of sections 3 [Grounds for jurisdiction] or 14 [Modification of custody decree of another state] has been met. "27 It is

submitted that sections 6 and 7 of the UCCJA apply to situations
where it has been determined that two states have concurrent jurisdiction and a decision must be made as to which state is the
most appropriate forum to act in light of the child's best interests.
The Commissioners' Note to section 7 contemplates that sections 6
and 7 become applicable only after jurisdiction has been determined in the affirmative under sections 3 or 14. Thus, "[t]he issue
of whether it is appropriate to exercise jurisdiction is secondary
to,
'28
lies."
jurisdiction
whether
of
issue
the
from,
and distinct
The Commissioners' Note to section 8 of the UCCJA, dealing
with "unclean hands," states that: "[s]ubsection (a) extends.

. .

to

cases in which a custody decree has not yet been rendered in any
state. .

.

.Subsection (b) does not come into operationunless the

court has power under section 14 to modify the custody decree of
another state."29
II. THE FIvE STEP PROCESS
Keeping the foregoing preliminary considerations in mind, how
and by what process should the Virginia attorney in his office and
the Virginia judge at the bench proceed to analyze whether the
Virginia court has jurisdiction to hear a certain custody case and
modify30 a child custody decrees1 previously rendered by a court of
26. 9 U.L.A. 135 (Master ed. 1979).
27. Id. at 139 (emphasis added). Section 3 of the UCCJA corresponds to VA. CODE ANN. §
20-126 (Cum. Supp. 1982), and section 14 corresponds to VA. CODE ANN. § 20-137 (CuM..
Supp. 1982).
28. Pierce v. Pierce,
- Mont.
-, 640 P.2d 899, 904 (1982).
29. 9 U.L.A. 142-43 (Master ed. 1979) (emphasis added).
30. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(b)(5) (Supp. IV 1980) defines "modification" and "modify" as fol-
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another state? Given the facts of the particular case, the following
five step analysis should be applied.
STEP 1: DETERMINE WHETHER VIRGINIA'S JURISDICTION IS PREDICATED UPON ANY OF THE GROUNDS
SET
2
FORTH IN VIRGINIA CODE SECTION 20-126A.3
If the answer is NO, then STOP. Go no further in your inquiry,

as a Virginia court would not have jurisdiction to even entertain
such a custody dispute, let alone modify a prior custody order of a
sister state.
If the answer is YES, then proceed on to Step 2."
lows: "'modification' and 'modify' refer to a custody determination which modifies, replaces,
supersedes, or otherwise is made subsequent to, a prior custody determination concerning
the same child, whether made by the same court or not . .. ."

31. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(b)(3) (Supp. IV 1980) defines "custody determination" as "a judgment, decree, or other order of a court providing for the custody or visitation of a child, and
includes permanent and temporary orders, and initial orders and modifications: ...."
32. The basis for Step 1 is found in 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(f)(1) (Supp. IV 1980). See supra
note 12.
VA. CODE ANN. § 20-126 (Cum. Supp. 1982) provides:
A. A court of this State which is competent to decide child custody matters has
jurisdiction to make a child custody determination by initial or modification decree if:
1. This State (i) is the home state of the child at the time of commencement of the
proceeding, or (ii) had been the child's home state within six months before commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from this State because of his
removal or retention by a person claiming his custody or for other reasons, and a
parent or person acting as parent continues to live in this State; or
2. It is in the best interest of the child that a court of this State assume jurisdiction
because (i) the child and his parents, or the child and at least one contestant, have a
significant connection with this State, and (ii) there is available in this State substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future care, protection, training, and
personal relationships; or
3. The child is physically present in this State and (i) the child has been abandoned, or (ii) it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because he has been
subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse or is otherwise neglected or
dependent; or
4. (i) It appears no other state would have jurisdiction under prerequisites substantially in accordance with paragraphs 1, 2, or 3, or another state has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this State is the more appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child, and (ii) it is in the best interest of the child that this
court assume jurisdiction.
B. Except under paragraphs 3 and 4 of subsection A physical presence in this State
of the child, or of the child and one of the contestants, is not alone sufficient to confer
jurisdiction on a court of this State to make a child custody determination.
C. Physical presence of the child, while desirable, is not a prerequisite for jurisdiction to determine his custody.
33. Caveat. If the Virginia court takes jurisdiction under VA. CODE ANN. § 20-126(A)
(Cum. Supp. 1982), on any ground other than subsection 1 ("home state" jurisdiction) (see
supra note 32), there exists some risk that at a subsequent time a court of another state
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STEP 2: DETERMINE WHETHER THE STATE WHOSE
COURT RENDERED THE PRIOR CHILD CUSTODY
DECREE
34
STILL HAS CONTINUING JURISDICTION.
The correct answer to Step 2 necessarily is predicated upon the
following three subordinate steps.
STEP 3: DETERMINE WHETHER THE PRIOR CHILD CUSTODY DECREE WAS MADE CONSISTENTLY WITH PKPA
SECTION 8(c)(2), AND WHETHER AT THE TIME THE
COURT TOOK JURISDICTION
THAT STATE WAS THE
35
CHILD'S "HOME STATE.

If the answer is YES to Step 3, then proceed on to Step 4.
If the answer to Step 3 is NO, having found that the other state
court did not base its jurisdiction upon "home state," it is the author's opinion that such decree is not entitled to full faith and
credit under the PKPA, because such custody determination in the
other state was not "made consistently" with PKPA Section
8(c)(2)(A).3 e Therefore, the Virginia court would have jurisdiction
would find under 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a) and (c)(2) that the Virginia custody determination
was not "made consistently" with the provisions of the federal act. Therefore, such Virginia
custody decree would not be accorded full faith and credit. See supra notes 9 and 10 and
accompanying text. The thrust of this caveat is concerned only with the issue of full faith
and credit status of a Virginia custody decree (predicated upon jurisdictional grounds other
than "home state") and not as to the invalidity of such a custody decree. But see, Foster
and Freed, supra note 8, at 2, col. 5, which states that "a custody decree or order that does
not conform to the new federal standards really is a nullity and must be so treated by the
courts, res judicata principles to the contrary notwithstanding." See infra note 36.
34. The basis for Step 2 is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(f)(2) (Supp. IV 1980). See supra
note 12.
35. The basis for Step 3 is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(A)-(D) (Supp. IV 1980).
See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
36. The UCCJA provides for alternative bases for jurisdiction with emphasis placed on
the "home state." Virginia E.E. v. Alberto S.P., 110 Misc. 2d 448,
, 440 N.Y.S.2d 979,
983-84 (1981). A review of VA. CODE ANN. § 20-126(A) (Cum. Supp. 1982) (grounds for jurisdiction) shows that each of the grounds for jurisdiction therein set forth is separated from
each other by the word "or." See supra note 32. The Commissioners' Notes to section 3 of
the UCCJA (which corresponds to VA. CODE ANN. § 20-126 (Cum. Supp. 1982)) state that
the "alternative test" between the home state ground and the next ground could create
concurrent jurisdiction in more than one state. 9 U.L.A. 123 (Master ed. 1979). Unlike the
UCCJA which provides an alternative basis for jurisdiction with emphasis placed upon
"home state" jurisdiction, the PKPA establishes exclusive and continuing jurisdiction in
the "home state." This difference in concept of jurisdiction between "alternative" jurisdiction under the UCCJA and "exclusive and continuing" jurisdiction in the "home state" as
set forth in the PKPA is predicated upon specific language in the PKPA which does not
appear in the UCCJA. In 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(B)(i) (Supp. IV 1980) (which immediately
follows the delination of "home state" jurisdiction in subparagraph (A)), there appears qual-
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to entertain such a child custody dispute and to modify the custody decree of the court of another state (providing, of course, that
the answer to Step 1 was YES). Again, if the answer to Step 3 is
NO, the Virginia court has jurisdiction and it is not necessary to go
to Step 4.
STEP 4: DETERMINE WHETHER THE COURT OF THE
ifying language immediately preceding the second ground of jurisdiction ("significant connection") in subparagraph (B) which states: "[I]t appears that no other State would have
, 440
jurisdiction under subparagraph (A) . . . ." See supra note 10; 110 Misc. 2d
N.Y.S.2d at 983-84. This language then is the reason why under the PKPA the second
ground of jurisdiction should be invoked only when no home state exists. Therefore, if a
court acting under the UCCJA assumes jurisdiction of a child custody dispute on the second
alternative ground ("significant connection") when in fact, there exists a "home state" for
such child, such second alternative ground of jurisdiction is not consistent with the PKPA
because it does not satisfy the PKPA qualifying language which requires that "it appears
that no other State would have jursdiction" under the "home state" ground. This lack of
consistency with the provisions of the PKPA denies such a custody decree its full faith and
440 N.Y.S.2d at 983-84,
credit status. In Virginia E.E. v. Alberto S.P., 110 Misc. 2d _
the court, quoting Foster and Freed, supra note 8, at 2, col. 1, stated that the qualifying
language of the PKPA had the effect of "regulating subparagraph (B) to a contingency status for custody jurisdiction or . . . a vacuum situation which makes it superfluous." See
supra note 33.
PKPA § 8, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(C) (Supp. IV 1980) (see supra note 10), which closely
parallels VA. CODE ANN. § 20-126(A)(3) (Cur. Supp. 1982) (see supra note 32), provides for
"emergency" jurisdiction based upon physical presence of the child in the state and either
(i) abandonment of the child, or (ii) necessary emergency to protect the child because of
actual or threatened mistreatment or abuse. Although the PKPA contains no specific qualifying language which would impair the full faith and credit status of such "emergency"
jurisdiction, it is submitted that this "emergency" ground for jurisdiction is not a viable
alternative for the "home state" jurisdiction for the following reasons: First, physical presence of the child is the only prerequisite. Second, this ground is usually exercised by a
juvenile court in cases "requiring immediate protection." See VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1241(A)(1) and (2) (Repl. Vol. 1982). This "extraordinary jurisdiction is reserved for extraordinarycircumstances. When there is child neglect without emergency or abandoment,
jurisdiction cannot be based upon this paragraph". 9 U.L.A. 125 (Master ed. 1979) (emphasis added). Third, the "emergency" jurisdiction is intended for the intervention of a court
for the protection of a child from abuse, and not for the purpose of providing another forum
for the modification of another court's custody order or for the reopening of a fully litigated
and decided custody battle by circumventing the jurisdiction of the "home state". Fourth, in
actual child abuse cases, the juvenile court can adequately protect the child whose home
state is elsewhere, not necessarily by exercising full jurisdiction to make a permanent change
in legal custody, but rather by maintaining temporary custody and shelter care until the
court of the child's "home state" can invoke its exclusive and continuing jurisdiction to
make a permanent change in legal custody. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-228(Q), 16.1-251,
16.1-252 and 16.1-253 (Repl. Vol. 1982). Fifth, it is suggested that there exists a paucity of
true bona fide "emergency" cases upon which jurisdiction can be predicated to trigger full
faith and credit status; therefore, such ground of jurisdiction is in reality only a "paper"
ground devoid of practical application of the full faith and credit provisions of the PKPA.
But see, Foster and Freed, supra note 8, at 2, col. 4, for what appears to be the opposite
view.

1982]

CHILD CUSTODY DECREE

OTHER STATE HAVING JURISDICTION HAS DECLINED
TO EXERCISE SUCH JURISDICTION TO MODIFY ITS
DECREE.3 7
If the answer is YES, then the Virginia court has jurisdiction to
entertain the custody dispute before it. The court may thus modify
the prior custody decree of the other state (providing, of course,
the answer to Step 1 was YES), and therefore it is unnecessary to
go on to Step 5.
If the answer is NO, then go on to Step 5.
STEP 5: DETERMINE WHETHER THE STATE WHOSE
COURT MADE THE PRIOR CHILD CUSTODY DECREE REMAINS THE RESIDENCE OF EITHER THE CHILD OR ANY.
CONTESTANT."8
If the answer to Step 5 is YES, then the concept of PKPA's exclusive and continuingjurisdiction in the "home state" is fully satisfied so long as the state of the prior custody decree remains the
residence of either the child or of any contestant. The Virginia
court, having no authority to modify the prior out of state child
custody decree, must, therefore, accord full faith and credit to the
out of state custody decree and decline to entertain jurisdiction to
hear the child custody dispute.
If the answer to Step 5 is NO, having found that neither the
child nor any contestant still resides in the other state whose court
made the prior custody decree, then that court no longer has jurisdiction. The Virginia court may then entertain jurisdiction to hear
the custody dispute and in so doing may modify the child custody
decree of such other state (providing, of course, the answer to Step
1 was YES).
HI.

CONCLUSIONS

Following the step-by-step analysis set forth above, one concludes that a child custody decree of another state can either fail
to attain or lose its full faith and credit status conferred by the
federal PKPA, and therefore be subject to modification by a Vir37. The basis for Step 4 is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(f)(2) (Supp. IV 1980). See supra
note 12 and accompanying text.
38. The basis for Step 5 is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(d) (Supp.IV 1980). See supra
note 11.
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ginia court of competent authority under the UCCJA 9 in the following circumstances:
1. when the out of state court's jurisdiction was predicated on
other than the "home state" jurisdictional factor because such
other state's child custody determination was not "made consistently" with the PKPA and is therefore contrary to the PKPA concept of exclusive and continuingjurisdiction in the "home state"40 ;
2. when the out of state court has declined to exercise jurisdiction to modify its prior determination; 4 or
3. when the other state whose court made the prior child custody
decree no longer remains the residence of either the child or any
contestant.4 2

39. See supra note 32.
40. It would seem that the only constitutional limitation on the prerogatives of the home
state which remains important is due process. If there is a violation of due process by
the "home state" its order or decree must be disregarded. However, both PKPA and
the UCCJA specifically require what amounts to procedural due process, and a failure
to meet their respective standards in that regard, vitiates the order or decree. So only
a substantive due process issue may arise under the PKPA and UCCJA.
Foster and Freed, supra note 8, at 2, col. 5 (footnotes omitted).
41. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(f)(2) (Supp. IV 1980). See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
42. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(d) (Supp. IV 1980). See supra note 11 and accompanying text.

